This essay will explore the claim that moral language has no special basis on which it can be judged to be true or not. It will argue that there is indeed no special basis on which moral language can be judged true or not, because there is more than one single basis for which moral language can be judged, hence resulting in the lack of a special basis. The implications of “no special basis” in this essay assume that there is no one special basis that may alter such language for it to change between true and false. Morals are standards that attempt to solve whether something, or some action, is right or wrong, therefore making “moral language” about how this judgement is conveyed through language, which is a method of conveying through statements. In this essay, “language” will also refer to verbal or written language.
To begin, we must define the word “judged”. Typically, to judge something means attempting to decide whether it is right or wrong, such as whether it is the right course of action. This shows that judgment requires conscience, interpretation and evaluation of the given situation. This perhaps implies that judgments come from an objective evaluation and one’s objective standards. But, morality may be considered subjective because it starts as a theory, as an attempt to solve moral problems. This makes morality dependent on subjective interpretations or experiences that influence the interpretation of moral statements.
In a cognitivist view, there may be a special basis on which moral language can be judged true or false. For example, in Kantian philosophy, it is believed that morality is based on duty and reason (deontology); therefore, the single special basis on which moral language can be judged true or not is what aligns with duty and pure reason. The Categorical Imperative in Kantianism argues that reason is morality, and one should only act on maxims (motives and intentions). A statement such as “killing someone is wrong” could be deemed true to a deontologist due to the principle of humanity. By killing someone, it is a violation of their duty to stay alive, which in itself is a violation against Kantian morality. In response to this example, a utilitarian may argue that, if killing this person reduces suffering (either their suffering or the community’s), then it would be moral to kill this person. This shows that even within the school of cognitivism, personal beliefs and moral frameworks can influence what “the moral statement of X is true, Y is false” means. Just as a tree has different branches that originate from the same stem, the same could be said about personal interpretations and beliefs, even within the same moral framework such as cognitivism. This shows that there are variations in what “special basis” means for each person, indicating that there is no single special basis.
That is not to say that a non-cognitivist viewpoint is safe from dilemmas related to moral language. A non-cognitivist may argue that moral language intrinsically cannot be true or false. For example, in emotivism, it is believed that moral statements only express the feelings of approval or disapproval, hence making such statements a mere reaction towards the action of the moral statement. For example, we would accept (approve) the claim that “donating to charities is good” or “killing is wrong”, but we would reject (disapprove) the opposite statements “donating to charities is bad” or “killing is right”. What is a real-life implication of this? For example, in law, language determines the legal perspective and the standard by which society holds itself. Since language itself is subjective, its meaning depends on subjective interpretations. While language can have objective definitions, it is dependent on the individual’s subjective experience. An abstract could be thought of as such – collectively, there are almost always two sides of people debating whether a given statement is right or wrong. But, if all we do is react to it, this not only shows that language is dependent and limited to one’s own subjective experience and interpretations, but it also shows that there isn’t an absolute claim for which moral language is true or false, even though language’s definition (such as individual words) can be objectively defined.
That said, since we can have our own subjective interpretations of words/language, it may not change the intrinsic meaning of the words themselves. Our understanding of words can come from associating them with an object, image (nouns), or action (verbs); therefore, language in this context covers verbal or written language. This can be supported by Foucault’s argument on symbolic fields, as these often refer to a culture or mental space structured by shared symbols with meaning and guide thought and behaviour within a community or system. The term “symbolic” in Lacanian psychoanalysis refers to language, laws, social structures, and other similar concepts. Therefore, the term “symbolic field” could be understood as “a field of activity or experience that refers to language, laws, social structures, etc.” By this definition, it shows that language is capable of communicating meaning. This interpretation could imply that moral language and morals as a whole are also an example of a symbolic field. For a community or system to adopt a moral framework (perhaps conveyed through moral language) shows that there is something that stands right (or wrong) for them to take on this specific shared value or moral. A common rebuttal to this could be moral nihilism, which states that since moral language is intrinsically just an expression. However, by arguing for a position, it is already an attempt to use logic and reason to persuade an ethical standpoint (one's moral framework), which is already an attempt to consolidate a basis for how moral language can be judged true or false. Moreover, the existence of multiple subjective interpretations also shows a different understanding of the said moral language between people, which then can affect how moral language can be judged true or false.
Hence, this shows that words are technically only names given to these objects/actions for our understanding, which itself is a form of interpretation. Therefore, by lacking an absolute, this also shows that moral language does not have the quality of being absolute, hence there is no absolute true or absolute false that the claim proposes.