This essay will argue that no single ethical framework can adequately address moral issues like euthanasia. The implications for this essay are that effectiveness is defined by clarity, minimising extremes, and the extent of real-world application. While utilitarianism justifies mercy through compassion and deontology protects life via duty, both risk extremes due to the slippery slope, where utilitarianism may permit abuse, and deontology may force suffering. While virtue ethics can be applied with another theory (between utilitarianism or deontology to support or argue against an argument made), it may be ineffective in preventing the slippery slope, hindering its effectiveness.
In the case of utilitarianism, it suggests that the action that maximises favourable consequences (such as pleasure) for everyone is the “right” choice in addressing moral issues. In the eyes of a utilitarian in the given scenario, they may be more supportive of euthanasia as it ends a patient’s suffering. We can connect this with a non-consequentialist theory, particularly virtue ethics – euthanasia can be a form of virtue through mercy and compassion. This also aligns with utilitarianism’s key idea of minimising suffering. Hence, if we adopt virtue ethics alongside utilitarianism, euthanasia could then be considered ethical, as we are mercy-killing out of compassion to end another’s suffering. Although this may seem favourable, there are some implications. Firstly, because utilitarianism has established that minimising suffering is the most ethical decision, and virtue ethics has established that euthanasia is out of compassion, the issue of compassion’s measurability is raised. While one can interpret that compassion in euthanasia relieves one from suffering (which aligns with utilitarianism), and preserves one’s autonomy and dignity by respecting their choice. But this can cause a slippery slope of where we deem suffering ‘suffering enough to justify killing to end it’. To an outsider, we are also unable to determine how another perceives their suffering in the same way – perhaps a terminal patient may not feel their suffering, even though on the outside we determine their condition as suffering, so does someone struggling with depression feel suffering but may remain unperceived. What this argument states is that while all suffering is ultimately suffering, it is difficult to quantify and ultimately subjective and, hence, hinders its effectiveness. Moreover, if we consider euthanasia ethical because it is a form of mercy and compassion, then we would need to draw the fine line between ‘mercy killing’ and ‘assisted suicide’.
Furthermore, on the other side of the debate (against euthanasia), particularly deontology, will be against this position of euthanasia’s ethicality. A deontologist may argue that no one has the right to decide who lives and who dies, thus making such a decision unethical. In the lens of Kantianism, this violates the duty of human responsibility and moral obligation to stay alive to contribute (survival as duty). Furthermore, if we also consider virtue ethics, by determining killing as an unvirtuous act, this further criticises the ethicality of euthanasia. However, some implications come from a deontological view of euthanasia. Because of deontology’s heavy emphasis on duty, we must determine by what standard killing a person is wrong. Although Kant argues that moral duties are derived from universal reason via the categorical imperative, in real life, there are many different deontic standards and duty list theories across cultures, religions and jurisdictions that follow different lists of moral rules and rights, such as the 10 commandments and human rights. One may argue that the lack of consistency between different deontic codes hinders deontology’s usefulness in addressing moral issues such as euthanasia because deontology risks failing to recognise cultural nuances in defining duty. Moreover, deontology in this scenario also risks criticism that it suppresses individual choice and autonomy, as a terminal patient could be visibly suffering but have no choice but to endure, as killing is intrinsically wrong in deontology. This shows that deontology risks being too black-and-white and fails to recognise nuance in ethical issues, leading to extreme solutions.
Therefore, this shows that addressing moral issues like euthanasia with only one ethical approach, between utilitarianism or deontology (or in combination with virtue ethics), may prove inefficient. Utilitarianism fails in preventing misuse and risks the slippery slope of the consideration of the extent of suffering; deontology may risk extremes and failure in recognising cultural nuances, risking cultural deafness; and virtue ethics may risk ambiguity in finding balance between the extremes caused by the slippery slope fallacies of utilitarianism and deontology.